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Abstract
The Clean Air Act gives two regulatory powers to one state – California – that it forbids
to all others: the power to regulate fuels, and the power to regulate motor vehicle construction.
This paper makes the novel argument that by creating a differential in power between the states,
these provisions violate the equal footing doctrine, and are therefore unconstitutional. In doing
so, it is the first law review article to provide a complete history of the doctrine, a foundational
principle that pre-dates the Constitution and remains the law of the land today. Though the
doctrine has been relegated to a bit part in modern jurisprudential debates, this article shows its
vitality and power, and argues its re-emergence should begin with a rejection of the Clean Air
Act’s California preferences.

I. Introduction
Under several provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA),2 California has powers denied to
all other states to regulate in the air quality arena.3 Because of these provisions, federal courts
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have repeatedly halted attempts by other states to enforce regulations California would be
permitted to make and enforce.4 This outcome is not simply unjust – it is illegal, because the
provisions of the CAA which give California its special status are unconstitutional. By giving
California the power to regulate in the air quality arena but denying other states the same
sovereignty, these provisions violate the equal footing doctrine, which holds that all the states of
the Union have equal dignity and sovereignty.
In this paper, I begin by outlining the provisions of the Clean Air Act that are intended to
differentiate the power of the States, and examine the legislative history regarding these
provisions and the unease many members of Congress felt about one State having powers denied
to the others. Following that, I discuss the unsuccessful court challenges to these preferences
that have been brought by unfavored states. I then turn to the equal footing doctrine’s history, I
begin by discussing the founder’s debate about whether the states of the Union should be equals,
concluding that both sides of the debate would not support the current state of affairs. The
history of the doctrine in the legislative branch, dating from the Continental Congress through
the first Congress and many Congresses since, follows. I finish the focus on the equal footing
doctrine by tracing its long history in the Supreme Court and noting some modern attempts to
use the doctrine in the appellate courts. I close by analyzing the application of the equal footing
doctrine to the CAA sections giving preference to California.

II. California’s Special Treatment in the Clean Air Act
Unlike other U.S. pollution laws, notably the Clean Water Act, the CAA does not permit
states to be “laboratories” that test out stricter regulations on engine emissions or the content of

2

42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
42 U.S.C. 7507 (CAA §177); 42 U.S.C. 7543(b) and (e) (CAA §209); 42 U.S.C. 7545(c)(4)(B).
4
American Petroleum Institute v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp.421, 431 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
3

2

fuels that impact pollution production. As detailed below, the exception to this is California,
which is allowed to create regulations stricter than that of the federal government. Other states
can choose to adopt the California standards or be subject to those set by the Environmental
Protection Administration (EPA). The legislative history of these provisions shows a tension
between the desire to have a single, federal standard for the benefit of many national industries
and the desire by some states for very strict standards that would be unnecessary for (or
unpalatable to) other states. While only a few judicial challenges to these provisions have been
made (and no challenge has been made under either the equal footing doctrine or the delegation
doctrine), but the judicial activity that there is shows the desire of states to exercise those powers
that California possesses, and a firm belief by courts that the CAA does not allow them to do so.
A. Statutory Provisions
The ability of states to regulate features of new motor vehicles that impact emissions are
governed by section 209 and section 177 of the Clean Air Act.5 Section 209 provides, in part,
that states may not “adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”6 There are two exceptions to this
provision. The first is also found in Section 209, which provides that any state that adopted
standards prior to March 30, 1966 can set standards that are more stringent than the federal
government’s standards, as long as those standards meet three conditions: (1) they are not
arbitrary and capricious; (2) they are needed to “meet compelling and extraordinary conditions”
and (3) the standards and their enforcement procedures do not clash with federal standards of 42
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USC 7521(a).7 As Congress knew when this law was enacted in 1970, California is only state
that promulgated such regulations before March 30, 1966.8
The other exception to §209 is found in §177, and was added in 1977. That section deals
with regulation of vehicle engines in areas where pollution causes air quality to fall below
federal standards, called non-attainment areas.9 The language of this provision makes the
preference for California all the more blatant:
“[A]ny State […] may adopt and enforce for any model year
standards relating to control of new motor vehicles or motor
vehicle engines […] if:
(1) such standards are identical to the California standards for
which a waiver has been granted for such model year; and
(2) California and such State adopt such standards at least two
years before commencement of such model year […].
Nothing in this section […] shall be construed as authorizing any
such State to prohibit or limit, directly or indirectly, the
manufacture and sale of a new motor vehicle or motor vehicle
engine that is certified in California as meeting California
standards, or to take any action of any kind to create, or have the
effect of creating, a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine
different from a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine certified in
California under California standards (a ‘third vehicle’) or
otherwise create such a ‘third vehicle.’”
In other words, after 1977, there are two types of vehicles permitted by federal laws from
which states can choose: the first vehicle that meets EPA-set standards, and the second vehicle
that meets California-set standards, as determined by California.
Non-road engines are also governed by §209. That provision begins by staying “[n]o
state or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard or other
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requirement relating to the control of emissions” that are intended to regulate non-road engines
in farm equipment and locomotives.10 However, a qualification to that provision is found in
§209(e)(2)(A), which again gives California a named exception:
“the Administrator [of the EPA] shall, after notice
and opportunity for public hearing, authorize
California to adopt and enforce standards and other
requirements relating to the control of emissions
from such vehicles or engines if California
determines that California standards will be, in the
aggregate, at least as protective of public health and
welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such
authorization shall be granted if the Administrator
finds that –
(i)
the determination of California is arbitrary
and capricious;
(ii)
California does not need such standards to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(iii) California standards and accompanying
enforcement procedures are not consistent with this
section.”
As with on-road vehicles and engines, in 1977, other states were given the power to adopt
standards “identical” to that of California in lieu of federal standards.11
The final provision that gives California special status compared to other states is § 211,
which deals with regulation of fuels. Under that provision, no state can set regulations requiring
the use of fuel additives or particular fuels as long as a federal standard has been promulgated
unless its regulations are “identical” to federal regulations set by the EPA.12 One exception to
this rule is found in § 211(c)(4)(B), which allows any state with a waiver under § 7543(b) – the
waiver only California is eligible for13 – “[to] at any time prescribe and enforce, for the purpose
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of motor vehicle emission control, a control or prohibition respecting any fuel or fuel additive.”14
Unlike the other provisions, this exception does not allow states to adopt California standards in
lieu of federal standards.
B. Congressional Debates about California’s Special Status
1. 1970
The debates in the House of Representatives, and to a lesser degree those of the Senate,
explain the reasoning behind such provisions. At the time the 1970 debates were taking place,
the only state which had imposed restrictions on the constructions of new motor vehicles was
California, which represented 10 percent of the auto market.15 There was some pressure to adopt
those standards as the minimum required nationwide, but the federal government had not
previously chosen to set such exacting standards.16
During the debate in the House of Representatives, some argued against the special
treatment of California, and argued all states should have the same powers. Representative John
Saylor of Pennsylvania proposed an amendment to allow any state to pass its own regulations
that would exceed the federal standards, arguing that Pennsylvania’s and New York’s air quality
problems were worse than those of California and his home state wanted to pass regulations that
exceeded the federal standard.17 Another representative argued that data available to Congress
indicated that the air in Los Angeles was nearly five times worse that of any other place in the
nation.18 Representative Sidney Yates, a Democrat from Illinois, spoke in favor of the
amendment, arguing that his home state might also wish to pass such regulation. Ultimately, the
feelings of those in favor of the amendment are summed up by Representative Leonard
14
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Farbstein, a Democrat from New York, who said he supported the amendment because it was
meant to ensure “that the other States of the Union have the same right that the State of
California has in setting standards that they deem necessary for the health and safety of their
people.”19
Representative Springer, the most vocal opponent of the amendment and a Republican
from Illinois, had the following justification for his argument:
Mr. SPRINGER. This was gone into in great detail. I will not go
into all of it here as to why it was, but it was felt that you could not
have 50 different emission standards. That is the reason, and that
could conceivably happen. […] Because he will let any locality
that wants to set up its own emission standards. When you do that
it means that you cannot drive from one county to another in
Illinois, just the same as you could not drive in 50 different States,
and you would have all different laws. […] May I say that we
would not have done it in the State of California except in one
county that has had the worst situation in the world, with the
possible exception of London. There was a good reason for the
exception of California.20
Others argued that leaving air quality decisions to the states would abrogate the federal
responsibility to ensure healthy air and relieve the pressure on the federal government to set
exacting standards.21 After a lengthy debate, the voices that argued that allowing all states to
regulate would be an abrogation of the federal responsibility to ensure healthy air and that 50
standards would be a practical nightmare prevailed. The amendment failed on a vote of 49 ayes,
79 noes.22 After its failure, three representatives offered an amendment to make California
standards those of the nation, arguing that the residents of New York should not be denied the
benefits those in California enjoyed, but it too failed.23
19
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When the bill reached the Senate, there was no challenge to California’s special status on
the floor as there had been in the House. However, supporters again defended California’s
special status, relying heavily on the argument that California’s air quality problems were much
more severe than those in the rest of the country and noting that California had more cars per
capita than any other state.24 A committee report noted that the automobile industry argued that
making California’s standards the national standard would be inappropriate because “California's
problem of automotive air pollution was unique and that different degrees of control for different
pollutants would be needed to deal with problems in other areas of the nation.”25 The report
went on to note that the bill as proposed contained federal pre-emption to “prevent a multiplicity
of State standards for emissions control systems on new motor vehicles” and the California
exemption existed due to “unusual instances.”26
Following a conference committee to resolve differences, the bill was passed by both
chambers with the California exemptions intact. President Nixon signed the bill into law on
December 31, 1970.
2. 1977 Debates
In 1977, the California preference again engendered some debate in Congress. A
proposed amendment to the Clean Air Act (which was later adopted) was offered to give all
states the power to choose between California’s standards or the federal standards (but not to
allow states to set their own standards.) The debate over this amendment led to an exchange on
the floor of the House of Representatives where members in favor of allowing states the ability
to choose from two standards (the federal or the California standard) used states’ rights
24
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arguments to defend that position, and those opposing it raised the specter of a nightmare of
interstate commerce where cars bought in one state would be illegal just across the border.
At one point in the debates in the House of Representatives , Timothy Wirth of Colorado
debated the question of the constitutionality of the California preference with John Dingell of
Michigan:
Mr. WIRTH. [C]ould the gentleman tell me how the ability
of the State of California or the State of Colorado or the State of
Michigan, or wherever it may be, to set its own standard is
unconstitutional, as the gentleman is suggesting? What is
unconstitutional about that?
Mr. DINGELL. The Constitution provides that whenever
the Federal Government speaks the States are not able to act in that
area and we have done so in the Clean Air Act, except with a
special exemption which we have enacted for the State of
California, and then I have just described the penalties as a result
of that. 27
Thus, although Dingell addressed the constitutionality of Congress’ power to govern
interstate commerce, he did not address the heart of Wirth’s question, which went to the equal
powers of the state, and the unconstitutionality of a grant of power to a single state denied to all
other states. Representative Andrew Maguire of New Jersey next took up Wirth’s argument,
beginning one exchange by noting that his state was the most densely populated, and had large
pollution problems related to traffic. He went on to say: “My State wants to be able to do what
California is doing, and as I understand it some other States might also wish to do so. Why
should we not be permitted to do that […]?”28 Others likewise took up the argument: “ [I]t
seems to me that we should not deny the right we have given to California or other States with
similar problems. […] [W]e have one State right now, [Colorado], which has specific problems
27
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today over in the city of Denver. Are we going to tell them they cannot solve their pollution
problems, just as California is solving theirs?”29
The states’ rights arguments prevailed, and the amendment to allow non-California states
the additional power to select California’s standard or the federal standard was adopted, and
became §177. However, Congress never addressed whether allowing the State of California the
power to set a national standard, while denying that power to all other states, was itself a
violation of the Constitution. The statutory language granting the California preference has not
been altered or added to since that time.
C. Attempting to Assume Equal Powers
Following the passage of the CAA, states attempted to go beyond the EPA-promulgated
standards in ways California was permitted to do. Though at least two states waged a court
battle in defense of their standards, neither were successful. New York attempted to regulate
fuels as California would be permitted to do in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, both Massachusetts
and New York attempted to regulate the construction of new vehicles in ways that differed from
California’s regulations, although California had proposed (but then moved back from) a similar
regulation.
1. Regulating Fuels -- The Jorling Decision
In the late 1980s, the state of New York attempted to regulate fuel volatility in ways that
exceeded federal standards and did not match the regulations of California.30 However, the
American Petroleum Institute sued in federal court, arguing that the regulations contravened the
CAA’s prohibition against any fuel regulation by a state other than California, and therefore
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violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.31 The Institute also argued that because the
regulation would unduly burden interstate commerce, the regulation violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause.32
Judge Thomas McAvoy of the Northern District of New York heard the Institute’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and New York’s cross-motion for dismissal. The court
found that because New York’s regulations were more restrictive than those promulgated by the
EPA, the conclusion that the Supremacy Clause applied and the state’s regulations therefore had
to yield was “inescapable.”33 Having so found, the court did not address the dormant commerce
clause argument. Although the court denied the injunction on the basis that irreparable harm
had not been shown, it left the state defendants little hope that its regulation could survive
without EPA choosing to adopt it.34
2. Regulating Vehicles -- The Zero-Emission Vehicle Cases
In the mid to late 1990s, New York was again testing the limits, but it had company –
Massachusetts. Both states (on EPA’s orders35) had attempted to enact a regulation called the
“Zero Emission Vehicle” standard. California had promulgated such a regulation in 1990,36 and
gained the required waiver from the EPA in 1993.37 California removed the “Zero Emission
Vehicle” standard, however, in regulating the 1988-2000 vehicle classes.38 The states of New
York and Massachusetts both attempted to retain this standard despite California’s pull back,
31

American Petroleum Institute v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp.421 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id.
33
Id. at 429.
34
American Petroleum Institute v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp.421, 431 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
35
Virginia v. Envt’l Protection Agency, Error! Main Document Only.108 F.3d 1397, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding the requirement to adopt California standards to be invalid as beyond EPA’s authority. New York and
Massachusetts governors, however, did not vote against the requirement to adopt California vehicle standards for
their states).
36
American Automobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 198-9 (2d Cir. 1998).
37
Ass’n of Int’l Automobile Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dep’t of Environmental Protection, 208 F.3d 1,3 (D.Mass. 2000).
38
152 F.3d at 199.
11
32

arguing the standard they adopted was acceptable because it had been identical to one approved
for use in California.39 However, federal courts ruled that because the state’s standards for the
vehicle class at issue did not exactly match those of California’s for the vehicle class at issue, the
standards were invalid as contrary to the CAA.40
In summary, the CAA’s preference for California (which is clearly present in the statute)
was challenged in Congress at the time of its adoption as unfair to other states. Although states
other than California have attempted to enact regulations that California would be allowed to
enforce under its special powers, the courts have held firm to the intent of Congress: a preference
for California that prevents other states from doing what California may do. The next section of
this paper discusses why such a preference is unconstitutional.

III. Equal Footing Doctrine: Its History and Modern Structure
In 1845, a Supreme Court justice called a dispute that revolved around the equal footing
doctrine “the most important controversy ever brought before this court.”41 More recently,
however, the doctrine has not been so gripping – it fact, it is cited as one of the most boring areas
of law with which the Supreme Court must contend.42 The equal footing doctrine is used to such
dramatic reversals of status, however. The Constitutional Convention seemed to reverse its
previous decision on whether or not to include such language every time it voted, finally settling
on an ambiguous comprise. Then, for nearly half of this country’s history, the Supreme Court

39

152 F.3d 196; 208 F.3d 1.
Id.
41
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 235 (1845) (J. Catron dissent).
42
Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice and “Boring” Cases, 4 The Green Bag 401, 402 (2001). This lack
of cachet is likely due to the doctrine’s primary use in disputes over the ownership of submerged lands (coupled
with the receding public interest in control of waterways in the era of the automobile and federal highways), coupled
with the emergence of the federalism jurisprudence as the primary basis for protecting the powers of states.
12
40

wavered between holding the doctrine was a statutory one that could be overridden by Congress’
later acts, and holding the doctrine was constitutional in nature.
Whether the equal footing doctrine renders the California preferences in the Clean Air
Act unconstitutional depends on whether the doctrine is a constitutional one in the first place.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently labeled it a constitutional doctrine for some time
now, because of the importance of the question to this paper’s thesis, I will explain the doctrine’s
evolution through the Constitutional Convention, the first Congress’ adoption of it, the doctrine’s
evolution through Supreme Court jurisprudence, and conclude with a summary of what is now
broadly recognized as the basis and contours of the equal footing doctrine.
A. The Constitutional Congress – The Debate, the Resolution, and Its Implications
The Constitutional Congress of 1787 engaged in a serious debate about whether lateradmitted states (new states) should have the same powers as the founding states (the original 13).
The chief opponent of giving new states power to those equal to the first thirteen was
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania; he was joined in his vociferous opposition by Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts.43
Gerry spoke about the “dangers” posed by the Western states, and warned against putting
the original states “in their hands. They will, if they acquire power, like all men, abuse it. They
will oppress commerce and drain our wealth into the Western country.”44 He made a motion to
limit the number of new states to 12 or less, so they would not outnumber the original states,
which was seconded by Rufus King of Massachusetts.45

43

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States, 109 (1913).
William Peters, A More Perfect Union; The Making of the United States Constitution, 123 (1987).
45
Id.
44

13

A vocal voice in favor of equal footing for all states was Roger Sherman of Connecticut,
with support from two Virginians, James Madison and George Mason.46 Sherman spoke against
Gerry’s motion, expressing his view that there was “no probability that the number of future
states will exceed that of the existing states,” but arguing that since “our children and
grandchildren […] will be as likely to be citizens of new Western States as of the old states, […]
we ought to make no such discrimination as is proposed by the motion.”47 The motion failed on
a vote of five states to four.48
However, the issue was far from settled, and soon a new proposal came from Morris.
Morris argued that the Constitution should be structured to ensure the original states would
dominate the national government.49 This proposition had precedents within the existing
governmental system: several of the original states, including North and South Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, did not allow later-created counties in the western portion of those
states to participate equally in their state legislatures and assemblies.50
Morris chaired the Convention’s first committee responsible for apportionment of
representatives from the existing and future states. In that role, he, with the help of Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts, brought forth a proposal that was intended to give the original thirteen
the power to “deal[] out the right of Representation in safe numbers to the Western States.”51
This proposal was adopted by the Convention.52
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However, something curious happened when it came time to actually draft the language
of the Constitutional provisions regarding the admission of states. The Committee of Detail,
consisting of Morris’ ally on the issue, Gorham of Massachusetts, John Rutledge of South
Carolina, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut, emerged from their work with a provision that new states should be “admitted on
the same terms with the original states.”53 This is surprising on two counts: first, the Convention
had adopted the proposal opposing the type of language offered, and second, most committee
members hailed from states that did not give newer counties equal representation. Max Farrand
notes the Committee chose this language “either on their own responsibility or because they
interpreted the views of the convention that way.”54 Morris objected strenuously, on the grounds
that such a measure would throw power into the hands of the newer states.55 Madison and
others opposed him, but Morris’ proposed language carried the day: “New States may be
admitted by the Legislature into the Union.”56
After the Louisiana Purchase, Morris was asked to explain this exact section of the
Constitution, and did so in a letter to his friend Henry W. Livingston, as follows:
“Your inquiry … is substantially whether the Congress can
admit, as a new State, territory, which did not belong to the United
States when the Constitution was made. In my opinion they can
not.
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and
Louisiana, it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and
allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section
of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to
establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that,
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had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would
have been made.”57
* * * * * *
What implications does this history have for the equal footing jurisprudence? As
discussed below, although the Supreme Court now regularly recites the Constitutional basis for
the equal footing doctrine, at one time that was a hotly contested point. If it is not a
constitutional doctrine, and exists only in the statutory acts of admission or enabling acts, than
can Congress override it – for instance, by granting powers to California that the original thirteen
states do not have in the Clean Air Act? The history offers something for either side of the legal
debate, but about the founder’s opinion of the current state of affairs, there is less doubt.
For those who would argue the Clean Air Act is not unconstitutional despite the equal
footing doctrine, the best argument for that position is that the founders explicitly rejected
language allowing for such an equal footing when they formulated the Constitution. In other
words, the current Supreme Court jurisprudence that finds this doctrine is a constitutional one
sits uneasily beside a history of the founders explicitly rejecting the inclusion of such provisions.
If it is not a constitutional doctrine, than the equal footing doctrine would arise only from the
statutes that regard the admission of new states, and therefore, might be overridden by later
Congressional action.58
The compromise language finally adopted by the Convention, however, has an evenness
of treatment in other provisions that contradicted the professed aims of the opponents of the
57
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“equal footing” language. The representation in both houses of Congress is not dependent on the
date the state joined the Union. The author of the crucial sentence regarding admittance (“New
States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union”) argued that it prohibited Congress
from admitting any state formed from territory not owned by one of the states at the time of the
Constitution’s adoption, and required that they remain provinces. However, that interpretation is
difficult to pull out of the sentence in question, and Morris alone appears to have managed it.
Even Morris admitted that many other founders would not have agreed with it, and the debates
make it clear that a contentious issue was essentially resolved with compromise language that
had as its chief asset room for ambiguity.
What a clear majority (if not all) of the founders would have thought about a new state
(California) having powers denied to all the original states, however, is not ambiguous. It is
clear from their writings that even the founders who objected to the “equal footing” language
would object more vociferously had they believed the Constitution allowed Congress to grant
California powers while denying those same powers to original states like Massachusetts and
New York. Therefore, even if the founders voted against an explicit statement of equality, there
is little support for the idea that the founders believed this allowed new states to have powers
denied to the original states. To the contrary, the history of the Convention makes it clear that a
provision disallowing newer states powers denied to the original thirteen would have been quite
popular. The fact that this allocation of power was made a Congress where Representatives and
Senators from new states far outnumber those from the original states would likely have caused
the proposal to limit the number of states or their representation in Congress to allow the original
states to dominate might very well have carried the day. In summary, even though there is
ambiguity about the equal footing doctrine at the Constitutional Convention, what we know of
17

the debates makes it clear that none of the founders countenanced the idea that a newer state like
California would have powers that the original thirteen did not possess.
B. Statutory Equal Footing
1. The Northwest Ordinance (Continental Congress)
In July of 1787, while the founders were debating whether or not to insert the words
“equal footing” into the Constitution, another governing body, the Continental Congress, was
inserting it into law. The words “equal footing” appeared first in the Northwest Ordinance of
1787.59 Under a portion of the Ordinance to be “considered as articles of compact between the
original states, and the people and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable
unless by common consent,” comes the language that territories should have the opportunity “for
their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the original States, at
as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest.”60 Another “article of compact”
provided that national debts would be paid “according to the same common rule or measure, by
which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other States.”61
2. The First Congress
Very early in its first term, the first Congress voted to have the Northwest Ordinance
continue in full effect under the newly constituted government, reprinting it in full as part of the
statutes at large of the United States.62 Curiously, however, when admitting new states, it did not
immediately use the “equal footing” language contained in the Ordinance, although the statutes
for the admission of states do contain comparable language. The first state to be admitted after
59

An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio. July 13,
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1 Stat. 50, Chap. VIII (1789). The Northwest Ordinance received final House approval on July 21, 1789, Senate
approval on August 4, 1789, and was signed into law by President George Washington on August 7, 1789.
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the adoption of the Constitution, was Vermont, in March of 1791, followed by Kentucky, with a
1792 admission dates. Both statutes (those for Vermont and Kentucky) provide that the new
states “shall be received and admitted into this Union, as a new and entire member of the United
States of America.”63 The new Congress also gave the new states two seats in the House of
Representatives pending the first census.64 Thus, although they did not use the language of
“equal footing,” the amount of representation indicates that Congress understood the phrase
“new and entire” member states to the same rights and treatment as the original states.
3. Later Statehood Acts
The next state to join the Union was Tennessee, in 1796. Congress again failed to use the
words “equal footing” in the applicable legislation, but expressed its sentiments regarding
Tennessee’s status in much longer language: “in all other respects, as far as they be applicable,
the laws of the United States shall extend to, and have force in the state of Tennessee, in the
same manner, as if that state had originally been one of the United States.”65
The Enabling Act of 180266, which set forth the guidelines for the admittance of Ohio, is
where the use of the words “equal footing” and “same footing” reappeared front and center.67
The words “equal footing” appear in the title of the Act (“the admission of such state in the
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1 Stat. 191 Chap. VII (1791) (Vermont); 1 Stat. 189 Chap. IV §2 (1791) (Kentucky).
1 Stat. 191 Chap. IX (1791).
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Generally, the process of admitting states to the Union involves two major pieces of federal legislation: an
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statehood. E.g. 3 Stat. 289-291 Chap. LVII (1816) (titled “An act to enable the people of the Indiana territory to
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Union, on an equal footing with the original States”).68 The first section of the Act uses similar
language, while also echoing some of the language from the Tennessee Act of Admission: “said
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon the same footing with the original
states, in all respects whatever.”69
From 1802 forward, the words “equal footing” or “same footing” appeared in the title or
statute of all other enabling acts and acts of admission, such that every state admitted to the
Union has explicitly entered on such footing.70 In addition, Mississippi’s Admission Act of 1817
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contained a direct reference to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, noting that the admission of the
state on an “equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever” was pursuant to the
terms of the Ordinance.71 That Ordinance’s terms were also referenced in severalother
statehood Acts.72
C. Equal Footing in the Supreme Court
The majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with the equal footing doctrine have been
about the title to lands, especially submerged lands. It has played a key role, however, in some
of the biggest issues of the United States’ political history: decisions regarding the federal and
state government relationship to American Indian tribes, the slavery debate, the spread of
religious freedom, and most of all, the relationship between the federal government and that of
the states. Although it wasn’t until the 1840s that the Court would declare the doctrine had a
Constitutional as well as a statutory basis, the Court has been remarkably consistent in describing
the key role the equal footing doctrine plays in the nation’s political structure. In addition, the
Court has always seen the heart of the doctrine as a protection of political rights, and guarded
any perceived encroachment on political rights more carefully than state claims to land under the
doctrine. Below, I discuss how the Supreme Court’s equal footing jurisprudence has evolved
over time.
1. Pre-Civil War: Land, Corpses, and Slavery
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the equal footing doctrine was in 1831 is more
famous for other reasons:Cherokee Nation v. Georgia , 30 U.S. 1 (1831). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Baldwin noted that every state that had given up land to the federal government
(Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona Enabling Act) (as amended by 34 Stat. 1286 Chap. 2911 (1907)); 72 Stat.
339 § 1 (Alaska); 73 Stat. 4 § 1 (Hawaii)
71
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72
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had conditioned that cession on the formation of states that would be admitted to the Union on
“an equal footing with the original states.” Id. at 35. Citing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
he found the intention to form “new, free, sovereign and independent states” to be the “clear
meaning and understanding of all the ceding states, and of Congress, in accepting the cessation
of their western lands up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” Id. He went on to cite
the Tenth Amendment for the idea that the states had an unimpaired right to individual
sovereignty, in that the municipal regulations of one would not have any legal effect on those of
another, and stated more generally that the Constitution “recognized” the sovereignty of an
individual state. Id. at 47-48.
The first majority opinion of the Court discussing the equal footing doctrine came four
years later. Mayor of New Orleans, et al. v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224 (1835). It was swiftly
followed by a second opinion, which also grappled with the difficulties of sorting out
Louisiana’s complex legal history. Mayor of New Orleans, et al. v. United States, 35 U.S. 662
(1836). In De Armas, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, was asked to decide which
of two claimants to a parcel of land had the better title: the petitioners, who traced their title back
to a grant from the Spanish government, or the City of New Orleans, who claimed a right to the
land under the terms of French law and therefore the treaty providing for the purchase of
Louisiana. De Armas, 34 U.S. at 225-26. Marshall found that the Court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the question, holding specifically that the Act admitting Louisiana as a state “on an equal
footing with the original states in all aspects whatever” could not be read to give jurisdiction over
the dispute. Id. at 235. Marshall noted that jurisdiction might exist under such a provision,
however, if New Orleans was arguing the United States had laid a claim to land that rightfully
belonged to the state of Louisiana. Id. at 236.
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Given the Court’s opinion of 1835, it is unsurprising that the case of 1836 involved New
Orleans’ contention that the United States had claimed land that rightfully belonged the City of
New Orleans (via the State of Louisiana). 35 U.S. 662. The Court stated that the rights of
Louisiana were the same as the original states, since she was admitted to the union “on the same
footing.” Id. at 737. On that basis, the Court found the federal government could not claim the
disputed property. Id. The court did not state whether the equal footing doctrine that decided the
case came from its admittance statute or the Constitution.
In 1840, the Supreme Court once again considered how the equal footing doctrine played
into the tangled legal history of Louisiana.73 In the case of Lessee of William Pollard’s Heirs v.
Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, Justice Baldwin, who had been assigned many times to cases involving
Louisiana property disputes, wrote a concurring opinion in which he cited the Constitution, the
Northwest Ordinance, and the “general course of legislation by Congress, in relation to the
government and property in the dispute territory” in drawing his conclusions that the property in
Louisiana was subject to the same laws as if the property had lain in another state.74 He stated
that the equal footing of Louisiana was established when Congress passed Louisiana’s Enabling
Act, in 1805, thus extending the principles of the Northwest Ordinance to it.75 Justice Baldwin
then listed the right to equal footing along with the rights to trail by jury and habeas corpus,
among others.76
Just two years later, there was another concurring opinion mentioning the equal footing
doctrine in a case involving title to land that had been under different crowns (although this time,
the land in question was in Alabama). In City of Mobile v. Eslava, Justice Catron explained that
73
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that the Court was aware of an opinion from the Supreme Court of Alabama, in which the lower
court reasoned (in part) that because the original states had title to the submerged lands of their
states, the equal footing doctrine would be violated if Alabama was not given the same title.77
The majority of the Court affirmed the lower decision without reference to the equal footing
doctrine, deciding the question on statutory interpretation alone.78 Justice Catron wrote to take
give his interpretation of the equal footing doctrine, writing:
The stipulation in the ordinance of 1787, and which is
repeated in the resolution admitting Alabama, guarantying
[sic] to the new state equal rights with the old, referred to
the political rights and sovereign capacities left to the old
states, unimpaired by the constitution of the United States;
and which were confirmed to them by that instrument […
New states have] equal capacities of self-government with
the old states, and equal benefits under the Constitution of
the United States. This is the extent of the guarantee. That
each and all of the states have sovereign power over their
navigable waters, above and below the tide, no one
doubts.79
This spirited defense of the concept of equal footing has interesting implications for the equal
footing jurisprudence: first, although the concurrence refers explicitly to statutes, it also implies a
Constitutional basis for the equal footing doctrine (“equal benefits under the Constitution”).
Second, it makes clear that the ownership of land is relatively minor piece of the doctrine; at its
heart, it refers to the equality of the political rights of all states.
In 1845, there were two cases on the court’s docket that dealt with the equal footing
doctrine, and the first explicit arguments that the doctrine was constitutional in nature appeared
in that context. Despite Justice Catron’s focus on the political rights, the next time the justices
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took up the topic again, 80 it was yet another submerged lands case out of Alabama.81 However,
the Court’s opinion did not limit itself to land issues. Writing for the Court, Justice McKinley
cited the Northwest Ordinance, but for the first time, expressed a specific Constitutional basis for
the doctrine as well.82 After quoting Article IV, § 3, which governs the admission of new states,
he then went on to say, “When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with
the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent
domain[.]”83 The Court went on to clarify that the doctrine was a Constitutional and not merely
a statutory one, finding (in dicta) that even if there had been an express stipulation of the rights
of sovereignty or eminent domain, such a stipulation would have been “void and inoperative
because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction [or]
sovereignty” over the objections of a state.84 “The right of Alabama and every other new state to
exercise all the powers of government, which belong to and may be exercised by the original
states of the union, must be admitted, and remain unquestioned.”85 The Court went on to hold
that the only regulations Congress could impose on a new state are those that it could also
impose on the original states.86 That the same reasoning also meant that a new State’s power
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“does not […] exceed the power thereby conceded to Congress over the original states on the
same subject.”87
Although Justice Catron dissented, he objected not to the grounding of the doctrine in the
Constitution or even the broad statements about the scope of permissible regulation by Congress,
but to the doctrine’s application to submerged land title. He argued that “no state complains,
nor has any one ever complained, of the infraction of her political and sovereign rights by the
United States,” and that the case was really one regarding a right of property.88 He argued that
the United States was being denied rights given to private landowners: “The United States did
not part with the right of soil by enabling a state to assume political jurisdiction.”89 He closed
his dissent noting that he had chosen to write “because this is deemed the most important
controversy every brought before this court, either as it respects the amount of property involved,
or the principles on which the present judgment proceeds.”90 In other words, the principles as to
the political rights of states were not, in his view, in dispute; the specific application to the title
of submerged lands was the application of the doctrine with which he took issue.
The second case of the term, Permoli v. City of New Orleans, was unquestionably about
political rights, and Justice Catron wrote for the Court.91 The City of New Orleans had passed a
statute fining Catholic priests who displayed corpses during funerals in the churches, requiring
that open-casket services be held in a specific chapel. The Rev. Bernard Permoli violated the
statute and was fined accordingly. Noting that “the Constitution makes no provision for
protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties” but that the state’s
enabling act had required Louisiana to protect those rights as a condition of acceptance of their
87

Id. at 230.
Id. at 233.
89
Id. at 234.
90
Id. at 235.
91
Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
88

26

petition for statehood, the Supreme Court set out to resolve the conflict.92 In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Catron, the Court found that it was proper for Congress to announce
the terms under which it would accept a statehood petition, and that it had the choice to reject as
a whole or accept as a whole such a petition, taking into account whether the “proper principles”
were reflected in the proposed state constitution.93 If Congress admitted a state, then it was
precluded from going back to alter the state’s constitution to comply with the enabling act.94 The
Court rejected the idea that the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance protecting religious
liberty applied following statehood, or indeed that any territorial guarantees survived statehood
absent an explicit statement of such.95 Since the only guarantee of religious liberty was therefore
found in the State’s Constitution, the question of whether the ordinance violated the state’s
Constitution was a matter of state, not federal, law, “equally so in the old states and the new
ones.”96 The reference to the old states is best understood this way: if the enabling acts did
create requirements for new states, then all legislation from those states that might or might not
be in violation of the state Constitution would also raise a question of federal law under the
enabling act. The original 13 states had no enabling acts, and therefore, they would never have a
question of federal law in the same situation. The Court found that such a situation would
violate the equal footing doctrine, and therefore, found there was not a federal question presented
because the enabling act ceased to have an effect once the state was admitted. The Court
therefore reasoned it had no jurisdiction.97
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The next case to discuss the equal footing doctrine in any depth was the notorious Dred
Scott v. Sanford.98 Although it did not become the heart of the decision, it is apparent with
hindsight that although the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the basis that
Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, the Court’s decision to rely on the Permoli
reasoning regarding the equal footing doctrine99 made future compromises problematic. Justice
Nelson’s concurring opinion may best illustrate the wrench that Permoli had thrown in the
slavery debate: “[I]t belongs to the sovereign state of Missouri to determine by her laws the
question of slavery within her jurisdiction, subject only to such limitations as may be found in
the Federal Constitution. […] That is the necessary result of the independent and sovereign
character of the State.”100 In other words, even if the Enabling Acts or Acts of Admission of a
state specified that it should enter the Union as a slave or free state, there would be no legal
recourse if, for instance, a state that had entered as a slave state then outlawed slavery.
2. The Equal Footing Doctrine Splits: Political vs. Property Rights
Between the Civil War and 1895, the Courttook only four cases that mentioned the equal
footing doctrine, and all dealt with title to submerged lands. Other than affirming in strong
language that the equal footing doctrine was “settled” law with both a statutory and
Constitutional basis, the cases were unremarkable.101 In 1896, the Court, in the first of many
cases to do so, decided a title dispute with an American Indian tribe in which it weighed treaty
98
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language with the tribe against the land title the State claimed as a result of the equal footing
doctrine.102 The case continued the trend of increasing stress on the Constitutionality and broad
nature of the principle of equal footing, stating that Wyoming was “endowed with powers and
attributes equal in scope to those enjoyed by the states already admitted” and that the recognition
of equal rights was “merely declaratory of the general rule.”103
The new century brought some new facets to the equal footing doctrine, as the Court took
the opportunity to delineate between two branches of the doctrine: the branch dealing with
property rights, and the branch dealing with political rights. Stearns v. Minnesota involved a
challenge in a Minnesota law thatgave a railroad company a special break on taxation of lands
that were previously public lands given by the federal government to the State at the time of
admission.104 The Court explained that “different considerations may underlie the question as to
the validity” of compacts between the State and the federal government regarding “political
rights and obligations” and those compacts that deal only with property.105 The Court continued,
“It has often been said that a state admitted into the Union enters therein in full equality with all
the others, and such equality may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying
political rights or obligations.” Finding that property provisions did not truly involve a question
of equality of status, the Court held that the State could be required to live up to the obligations
of trust that the federal government had imposed as a condition of the land cession.106
The Court’s reaffirmance of the importance and centrality of the political implications of
the equal footing doctrine, and in recognizing but downplaying the property implications, was an
obvious outgrowth of much of the jurisprudence of the equal footing doctrine as a whole, going
102
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back as far as Justice Catron’s concurrence in 1842.107 Stearns did, however, mark an important
doctrinal step, in that the Court declined to extend Permoli. Recall that in the Permoli decision,
the Court unanimously rejected the idea that federal courts could revisit the decision of state
Supreme Courts as to the meaning of state Constitutions simply because the enabling act of a
state required certain elements in that Constitution. One line of reasoning that underlay that
decision was that there could never be a federal cause of action for the original 13 states in the
same situation, as they would not have an enabling act, and therefore, it would be a violation of
the equal footing doctrine to subject the newer states to federal court oversight. In Stearns,
however, the Court made no such argument considering property. Arguably, since the original
13 states had not received their public lands from Congress, none of their public lands would
have the same limitations.108 The Court might have found, therefore, that subjecting those lands
held publicly by newer states to extra obligations violated the equal footing doctrine. Instead,
the Court chose to put property rights stemming in part from the equal footing doctrine on a
lesser plane than political rights from the same source. Reading Permoli and Stearns together,
the two decisions create a dualism going forward that remains to this day between political rights
and land rights under the equal footing doctrine.
3. Fleshing Out the Political Branch of the Equal Footing Doctrine
After Stearns, the Court waited 11 years before addressing the equal footing doctrine
again, but resumed discussions with the most important case regarding the political branch of the
equal footing doctrine that has yet been written. Coyle v. Smith posed the question of whether
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Oklahoma was permitted to move its state capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City.109 Although
any schoolchild who has been made to memorize the state capitals knows they were allowed to
do so, few know why.
Oklahoma’s Enabling Act required that the capital of the state should be Guthrie until at
least 1913, and then could be moved only if the move was ratified by a popular election.110 It
became a state in 1907, and in 1910, the state legislature passed a law to erect the necessary
buildings in Oklahoma City and move the capital.111 The plaintiff, Coyle, owned a great deal of
land in Guthrie, and brought suit alleging that the move violated the state Constitution and
federal law.112 The Oklahoma Supreme Court found no violation, and the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to review that decision. What it took up was the question of whether there was a
violation of federal law.
Holding that “the power to locate its own seat of government, and to determine when and
how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for
that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers,” the Court also noted that the idea of a
federal mandate to move a state capital in one of the original 13 states “would not be for a
moment entertained.”113 With that preamble, the Court set out to decide the question it framed:
“Can a state be placed upon a plane of inequality with its sister states in the Union if the
Congress chooses to impose conditions which so operate, at the time of its admission?”114
The Court first turned to the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the admission of
states. It read those powers to have an inherent limitation, namely the lack of power to “admit
109
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political organizations which are less or greater, or different in dignity or power, from those
political entities which constitute the Union.”115 It then looked to the statutory basis of the equal
footing doctrine, noting that all the acts admitting new states into the Union had recognized their
equality with the previous states in terms that were, at a minimum, “emphatic and significant.”116
‘This Union’ was and is a union of states, equal in power,
dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that
residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution itself. To maintain otherwise would be
to say that the Union, through the power of Congress to
admit new sates, might come to be a union of states
unequal in power, as including states whose powers were
restricted only by the Constitution, with others whose
powers had been further restricted by an act of Congress.
[…] The argument that Congress derives from the duty of
‘guaranteeing to each state in this Union a republican form
of government’ power to impose restrictions upon a new
state which deprive it of equality with other members of the
Union, has no merit.117
With this background, the Court distinguished three types of provisions that might be
found in enabling acts: those that are fulfilled upon the admission of the state, those that are
intended to operate in the future and are within the scope of the powers of Congress over the
subject, and those that operate in the future that restrict the powers of a state in respect to matters
which would otherwise be exclusively within the sphere of state power.118 Citing Permoli, the
Court found the first set of provisions were Constitutional, in that Congress could require certain
provisions in state Constitution before admitting that state, but that upon admission, these
provisions would be “subject to alteration and amendment” just as any other part of the state’s
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Constitution would be.119 The Court closed the discussion of the first situation by saying, “There
is to be found no sanction for the contention that any state may be deprived of any of the power
constitutionally possessed by other states, as states, by reason of the terms on which the acts
admitting them to the Union have been framed.”120
The Court then turned to provisions intended to reach further actions that were within or
without the scope of the powers of Congress over the subject. The Court found that provisions
that exceeded the scope of Congress over the subject were void, because the state’s powers could
not be “constitutionally diminished, impaired, or shorn away by any conditions, compacts, or
stipulations […] which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional
legislation after admission.”121 In contrast, those conditions which could have legally been made
part of a statute would be enforceable, because the conditions were independently valid in that
they were a statute passed by Congress within its authority.122 The Court found that the question
of the capital location was obviously beyond Congress’ authority to dictate through legislation,
and hence, was unconstitutional.123 The Court closed with this language:
[T]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to the
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized. When that equality disappears we
may remain a free people, but the union will not be the
Union of the Constitution.124
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Coyle remains both the most recent case to discuss the political rights of states under the
equal footing doctrine and the case offering the best explication of the doctrine. 125 Though the
case was ostensibly only about the limitations in enabling acts that could be given weight, the
Court’s language was much more wide-ranging, concluding with broad language about the
equality of states as an essential foundation of the country. It also created a method for handling
challenges to conditions in enabling acts going forward: determine whether Congress could have
enacted the condition under its other statutory powers, and if so, it may be enforced. The Court
did not, however, address the potential problem this method creates: namely, the question of
whether Congress can pass a law that impacts only one state.
Going into the modern era, the best explication of the state of the equal footing doctrine
came in 1950, in the case of United States v. Texas.126 Citing Stearns, the Court noted the long
jurisprudential history of the equality of political rights (or “political standing”) and sovereignty
required by the equal footing doctrine.127 The Court separately discussed the effect the doctrine
has on property ownership, noting that the Court had consistently held that to deny the lateradmitted states ownership of submerged lands would deny them equal footing with the original
states, “since the original States did not grant these properties to the United States but reserved
them to themselves.”128 The Court also noted some matters that were outside the boundaries of
the clause:
It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing.
There has never been equality among the States in that
sense. Some States when they entered the Union had within
their boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal
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Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some
had special agreements with the Federal Government
governing property within their borders. [citation omitted]
Area, location, geology, and latitude have created great
diversity in the economic aspects of the several States. The
requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out
those diversities but to create parity as respects political
standing and sovereignty.129
3. Modern Supreme Court Cases: Submerged into the Submerged Lands Cases
Since the 1950s, there has not been a major equal footing doctrine case that dealt with
political rights or even discussed them. Instead, the equal footing doctrine has been used nearly
exclusively in cases deciding property issues regarding submerged lands, with resulting forays
into the areas of American Indian law and water law. Little more than a sentence or two is
devoted to the equal footing doctrine in these cases, usually simply a sentence citing the nature
of the doctrine before diving into the factual issues that bear upon a particular application.130
The exception to this rule of the modern era comes with two cases from the 1970s, where
the Court set forth a new principle as part of the equal footing doctrine, and then repealed it soon
after. The question on which the Court ruled and rapidly reversed itself was whether the equal
footing doctrine mandated the application of federal common law over the laws of a state. In
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, the Courtwas dec iding whether the ownership of previously
submerged lands divested from the State after the waters had been removed. The Court held
that the equal footing doctrine did not entitle the state to the deed to those lands, because there
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was no longer “a public benefit to be protected.”131 However, the Court held that the State’s
(unsuccessful) invocation of the equal footing doctrine meant that the Court had to use federal
common law to resolve the dispute.132
In 1977, the Court explicitly overruled Bonelli, teaching that the equal footing doctrine’s
affect on land ownership was at the time of admission only; after that time “the force of that
doctrine was spent”, and it was not a basis on which federal common law could be applied to
overrule the decisions of a state.133 The Court noted that “precisely the contrary is true” noting
that prior precedents had made it clear the doctrine results in a State taking title notwithstanding
post-statehood efforts of the federal government to grant that title to others.134 The reasoning of
the Court’s opinion hearkened back to that in the Permoli decision, noting that to decide that the
equal footing doctrine allowed federal common law to be applied
would result in a perverse application of the equal-footing
doctrine. An original State would be free to choose its own
legal principles to resolve property disputes relating to land
under its riverbeds; a subsequently admitted State would be
constrained by the equal-footing doctrine to apply the
federal common-law rule, which may result in property law
determinations antithetical to the desires of that State.135
The Court finished with an added justification for overruling its decision of just a few years
earlier by saying that the case raised “an issue substantially related to the constitutional
sovereignty of states”, and therefore, “considerations of stare decisis play a less important role
than they do in cases involving substantive property law.”136
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D. Modern Attempts to Revivify the Equal Footing Doctrine
Though the Supreme Court has not decided any cases dealing with political rights in modern
times, the Circuits have. In particular, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have considered attempts by
a wide range of litigants to revivify the political branch of the equal footing doctrine. Although
unsuccessful in their attempts, anti- nuclear activists, practitioners of polygamy, and the
Sagebrush Rebels have all attempted to use the doctrine. The first two groups mentioned are
primarily concerned with the political arm of the equal footing doctrine; the Sagebrush Rebellion
has focused on the property aspects. As discussed below, although their success has been
limited, the courts have continued, sometimes in dicta, to reaffirm the potential power of the
equal footing doctrine.
1. Nuclear Waste and the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Department of Energy has its sights set on putting the nation’s first long-term
geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Nevada, at a sight
called Yucca Mountain. In Nevada v. Watkins, the State of Nevada challenged Congressional
authority to designate Yucca Mountain, which is federal property, as the sole site for possible
development of the repository.137 Among other theories, the State raised the argument that the
equal footing doctrine prevented Congress from selecting a single state as the nuclear waste
repository for the country absent that state’s consent, because to do so would make her unequal
to her sister states.138
In a discussion of the doctrine that did not discuss whether the Court felt this question fell
within the property arm of the doctrine or the political arm, the Court ruled that since the passing
of the title to the States of submerged lands had not prevented the federal government from
137
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continuing to pass laws impacting navigation, the fact that the federal government did own
Yucca Mountain meant that there was no restriction on Congress’ power to enact regulations
concerning the national nuclear waste repository pursuant to the Property Clause.139 Although
the opinion did include a quote from Coyle v. Oklahoma, the opinion otherwise completely
lacked any indication that the panel understood the elevated position of the political rights equal
footing doctrine over the property rights equal footing doctrine. The fact that the decision used
the property rights side of the jurisprudence to decide an arguably political question, therefore,
makes the decision’s grounding fairly weak from a doctrinal standpoint.140
2. Polygamy and the Equal Footing Doctrine
In the 1980s, a policeman terminated for practicing plural marriage sued various state and
local officials, arguing that Utah’s Enabling Act (which prohibited polygamy forever) violated
the equal footing doctrine.141 Essentially, the plaintiff hoped to prove that Utah had been forced
to adopt this law as a condition of admission,142 and that requirement unconstitutionally
restricted Utah’s legislating powers. The Tenth Circuit, however, argued that there was no need
to reach this question, although it provided a lengthy footnote regarding Coyle v. Smith (the case
regarding the Oklahoma capital location).143 In an analysis that appeared to touch on questions
of redressability, the court noted that since statehood, Utah had never attempted to change those

139

Id. at 1555.
The opinion did quote United States v. Texas regarding the impossibility of the states being equal in (among
other things) geology. The best argument for upholding the court’s decision is that the Ninth Circuit implicitly
found the siting of a nuclear waste depository in Nevada to involve an inequality of rock formations rather than of
political rights. As the opinion itself did not make that argument, however, its strength is limited.
141
Potter v. Murray City et al., 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
142
Although the court did not need to address it, there is a great deal of historical support for the contention that the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, which made up the majority of Utahans at the time, did not wish to end
the practice of polygamy and did so only when it received word that federal soldiers were on the march toward
them. Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton, The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 165-68
(1979).
143
Id., 1068 n4.
38
140

portions of the state statutes and Constitution that prohibited polygamy.144 Noting that it was
“settled public policy” that it would be in Utah’s power to enact such a prohibition (as a
regulation of marriage), the court found the claim lacked merit, because of a lack of evidence
that the state government would choose to repeal the law but for the federal mandate.145
3. Sagebrush Rebellion
Attempts to expand the property branch of the equal footing jurisprudence have come
largely from the group of American Western activists known as the “sagebrush rebellion.”
Ranchers accused of allowing their animals to graze on federal lands without authorization raised
the clause as a defense in the late 1990s.146 The ranchers argued that the national forest lands
were not properly held by the United States, because the equal footing doctrine required all
public lands to be turned over to the State of Nevada upon its admission.147 Finding that the
Property Clause meant Congress would not be required to divest itself from title, regardless of
the equal footing doctrine, the court held that the federal government had the right to hold that
property upon Nevada’s admission.148
E. Conclusion
The equal footing doctrine has kept a low profile: it may be the least known doctrine that
has been the regular subject of Supreme Court decisions since the earliest days of the Union. It
has evolved into two, non-equal branches, both seen as having Constitutional roots. The first
branch of the doctrine to emerge was the less powerful one involving property rights of states,
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largely issues of title to submerged lands. This branch, which has involved the majority of equal
footing cases before the Court, has at its heart the holding that in order for the newer states to
have the same rights and sovereign powers as the original thirteen, those states had to hold title
to submerged lands, absent a pre-statehood grant of such lands to American Indian tribes by the
federal government. The second branch of the doctrine involves the political rights of states,
which the Court has stressed is more powerful than the protections offered to states regarding
land ownership. Attempts to limit or qualify the political rights and obligations of the states is
highly suspect under the equal footing doctrine.
Both branches of the doctrine, however, are rooted in the Constitution. Since 1845, the
Court has interpreted Article IV’s provisions regarding the admission of states and the
relationships between them as the constitutional underpinning of the equal footing doctrine. That
holding has been applied consistently since that time, and it is settled law. What remains
unsettled is whether the Clean Air Act’s provisions allowing California the right to regulate in
areas that are forbidden to her sister states are a violation of that doctrine.

III. Application of Equal Footing Doctrine to CAA and California
When Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970, and when it amended it in 1977, it had
the clear intention: to give to any state that had adopted certain emission control regulations
before 1966 the power not just to keep those regulations, but to engage in further regulation of
that industry.149 From the Congressional debates, it is clear that although the statutory language
did not specifically name California, the justifications for making the exception always had to do
with California’s air quality.150 That same regulatory power is explicitly denied to any other
states, as federal courts have ruled when some of the original states have attempted to exercise
149
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the same power.151 But although the Congresses that passed the original act and its 1977
amendments debated the fairness of giving one state powers denied to another, it did not debate
whether it had the power under the Constitution to do so. As discussed below, under the equal
footing doctrine, it did not.
A. Questions of Constitutionality
In order to evaluate whether the Clean Air Act’s provisions allowing California
regulatory power denied to other states is constitutional, it is necessary to answer a question the
Supreme Court has never directly faced: Does Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause
allow it place restrictions on some states but not others?
To answer that question, it is helpful to determine what limits the jurisprudence has
established exist, due to the equal footing doctrine. From Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, we know
Congress cannot use enabling acts to subject property in one state to laws different from that if
the property had lain in another state.152 From Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, we know Congress
cannot impose regulations on a new state unless the same regulations could be imposed upon the
original states.153 From Permoli, we know that no political right can be a matter of federal law in
one state unless it is a matter of federal law in all states.154 From Stearns, we know that the
equality of states “may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights or
obligations.”155 From Coyle we know that the “republican form of government” clause of the
Constitution does not give Congress the power to impose restrictions upon a new state which
deprive it of the equal power to exercise “the residuum of sovereignty not delegated by the
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Constitution itself” with other members of the Union.156 Finally, we know from Corvallis Sand
that one state cannot be constrained by federal common law when another State is “free to
choose its own legal principles.”157
Given this background, there are at least two issues that must be determined in order to
answer the question of ultimate constitutionality of the Clean Air Act’s California provisions.
First, does the Commerce Clause embody a more expansive grant of power than any of the
“republican form of government” clause, the clause allowing Congress to admit states, or the
judiciary’s ability to impose federal common law, such that it, unlike all these other powers, can
trump the Constitutional basis for equal footing? Second, if power is “conceded to Congress”
over the states,158 can Congress selectively bestow it on a some states but not others – in other
words, even if Congress cannot “take away” the powers of a single state, could it “give” its own
powers to a single state?
A. Commerce Clause vs. Republican Form of Government
The Supreme Court holds that the judiciary’s inherent powers to make the federal
common law cannot override the equal footing doctrine.159 Likewise, the Court holds that
Congress’ duty to guarantee to each state a republican form of government does not allow it to
override equal footing of the states.160 Thus, to argue that the Commerce Clause contains a
power these two provisions does not requires finding that the Commerce Clause was intended to
be a broader or stronger grant of power than the power to guarantee a republican form of
government.
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The Commerce Clause power comes in Article I’s list of Congressional powers unrelated
to the admission of new states; the republican form of government clause is found in Article IV,
which contains the full faith and credit clause, the provision requiring extradition among the
states, the fugitive slave clause, the admission of states, and the property clause. In other words,
the republican form of government clause is found in the set of clauses generally providing for
equality within and between the states. Thus, if any clause would be seen as moderating the
generality equality of each state, it would be the republican form of government clause.
There has never been a case in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the Article I
powers of Congress to be inherently any different from those powers given to Congress in
Article I are greater than those given in Article IV. Moreover, although the Commerce Clause
gives Congress the power to regulate commerce “among the several States,” it never makes any
statement that States can be treated differently, which would be important, given that so many
other provisions of the Constitution require that they be treated identically. In fact, like the
republican form of government clause, the Commerce Clause is placed nearby language
indicating the equality of States: Art I §8 clause 1 provides that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.” Finally, and most damningly for the proposition
that the Commerce Clause would allow differential treatment of states, Art I. § 9 clause 6 of the
Constitution states “No preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to
the Ports of one State over those of another.” The importance of this is underscored by the fact
that the original Constitution provided for income to the national government though taxation of
imports.161
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As the above discussion shows, the proposition that the Commerce Clause carries enough
weight to overcome the presumption of equal footing is faulty: not only is it a less obvious
source of such power than the republican form of government clause due to its placement in the
Constitution, but the document itself contains language limiting the use of the Commerce Clause
power and proscribing equality of the states in its usage. Therefore, the constitutionality of the
Clean Air Act vis a vis the equal footing doctrine cannot depend on Congressional exercise of
the Commerce Clause power.
B. Can Congress Give Differential Regulatory Powers?
The second argument in favor of the Constitutionality of the Clean Air Act’s California
provisions is that Congress is not “taking” the sovereign powers of the state protected by the
equal footing doctrine – it is selectively bestowing its own power to regulate.
The Supreme Court teaches that Congress may confer “upon the States an ability to
restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy. If Congress ordains
that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State
within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause
challenge.”162 However, it has not ruled on the question of whether Congress can infer the
power to regulate on a matter of interstate commerce on only one state – in other words, whether
such a delegation would be vulnerable to an equal footing clause challenge.
Proponents of such an argument might point to the jurisprudence allowing Congress to
spend tax dollars for any purpose it deems necessary and proper, without regard to equality
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between the states.163 Any analysis, however, would inevitably center on the differences
between the Commerce Clause and its powers to appropriate federal funds as it sees fit. For
instance, while the taxation clause has no accompanying restriction providing for equal treatment
of the states, Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce does: as discussed above, a clause
of the Constitution provides that Congress cannot use its power to give preference to one state’s
ports over another. In addition, the Court’s federalism jurisprudence indicates a strong
difference between the powers of Congress when appropriating funds and the power of Congress
to regulate. In New York v. United States, the Court noted that while the Congress may attach
conditions to receiving federal funds, it cannot otherwise commandeer state legislative processes
using its regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.164 Therefore, the Commerce Clause
does not appear to be able to insulate federal law from a challenge under the equal footing
doctrine.
The best argument for Congress’ ability to create an inequality of power through a poststatehood boon, even if it cannot do so by a pre-statehood restriction, is that the equal footing
doctrine does not mean that states must have equal regulatory powers, only that they must have
equal constitutional powers. In other words, a proponent of the differing regulatory power
given to California could argue that California has the same constitutional status of every other
state, and that what is being given is an extra-constitutional power. The argument would
continue that the political equality of states under the equal footing doctrine is restricted to the
constitutional powers, and does not require that the states have equal lawmaking powers within
their borders.
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Ironically, the case that best refutes this argument is the case that clearly states the limits
of the equal footing doctrine’s political arm. In United States v. Texas the Supreme Court noted
the parameters of the equal footing doctrine: economic, geographic, geologic, and area
differences were outside – “political standing and sovereignty” were inside.165
Reading the Clean Air Act California provisions makes it clear they involve differences
of political sovereignty, not geography or even air quality. Congress did not choose to allow all
states with air quality below a certain level the power to set these regulations; it allowed states
that had previously regulated air quality in certain ways to continue writing new regulations in
those areas, while forbidding all those that had not already acted. In other words, Congress
conditioned new powers on the decision of the States to exercise their own sovereign powers.
The one State that had chosen to regulate in particular ways was given a power denied to all the
States that had chosen not to exercise their (until then) equal right to do so.166 There is no
provision allowing this power to disappear once California’s air quality was brought in line with
that of her sister states, nor is there a provision to allow a State with air quality worse than
California’s equal regulation. This underscores that these provisions are not about an inequality
of economics or geography – they are about sovereignty. As such, they are the kind of
provisions to which the equal footing doctrine is intended to apply.
The soundness of this conclusion is underscored by an examination of the founders’
intent. Those founders who opposed adding “equal footing” language to the Constitution – men
like Morris, Gerry, and King – did so because they feared that new states would come to have
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more power than the original thirteen. The proponents of equal footing argued that they did not
want discrimination, in that all the citizens of the new country should have the same rights.
These arguments make it clear that all the founders would have been united in their opposition to
a situation in which a newer State had regulatory powers denied to the original States. The
Constitution is devoid of language making distinctions between the powers of States, and several
provisions expressly seek equal treatment for all of them by Congress. The first Congress,
adopting in full the previous law passed under the Articles of Confederation, placed the equal
footing doctrine into law, and did not pass laws that gave one state powers different from that of
another. The founders’ negative opinion of the power of Congress to devolve special powers on
California, therefore, can not be much in doubt.

IV. Conclusion
The equal footing doctrine renders unconstitutional those provisions of the Clean Air Act
giving to California a right to regulate certain aspects of air quality, and denying them to other
states. There are two potential outcomes: first, that attempts of other States like New York and
Massachusetts to enact regulations that California has the power to enact should be permitted.167
If the federal government is concerned that 50 or more different regulatory enactments would be
unworkable, there is a simple solution: it could promulgate two sets of standards, one more
stringent than the other, and allow each state to choose between them. The end result, therefore,
might be the status quo, except that the citizens of California would not be given more powers
than the citizens of other States.
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States attempting to regulate in these arenas would have standing to raise a Constitutional challenge to the equal
footing doctrine. Assuming New York and Massachusetts did not repeal the statutes imposing zero-emission
controls following the court decisions, these states might now be able to bring such a challenge. In addition,
automotive companies forced to comply with California’s regulations would likely have standing to challenge those
regulations as an exercise of unconstitutional power, assuming they argued that the delegation to a single state of
Congress’ power to regulate was a violation of the equal footing doctrine, and is therefore void.
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The equal footing doctrine has roots in the laws of this country that pre-date the
Constitution. The Court has recognized a Constitutional nexus for it, the first Congress placed it
in a statute that is still applicable today, and the courts have repeatedly cited its fundamental
nature to the political structure of the United States. Though the majority of the cases throughout
time have dealt with land ownership issues, the jurisprudence has always recognized that the
most important feature of the doctrine is an assurance that each state would have the same
sovereignty within its borders as every other state. Just as this Union should have no second
class citizens,168 it should have no second class States.
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